

they will have to leave the country. Bearing in mind the serious nature of the civil conflict in Syria, of the world economic crisis, and of the global tendency towards longer and more frequent dry spell periods, nobody can come up with a favorable prognosis about Syria's future economic development. Therefore, we could assume that, by 2025, there is going to be an annual emigration pressure in Syria involving some 220 thousand people. And, should the current trends be preserved, we could expect that some 45 per cent of these people (about 100 000 persons) are going to set off on the Eastern Mediterranean migration route towards the EU, which goes via Bulgaria.

The situation is very much similar in respect of Afghanistan, the next significant country in terms of exerting migratory pressure upon Bulgaria. By 2025, 7.2 million people in this country are going to join the working-age population group for the first time in their lives. At the same time, 1 million people are going to leave this group for good. Thus, we are left with a difference of 6.2 million people out of which 4.3 million are going to look for employment. The potential annual emigration pressure is going to involve about 430 thousand people. And, if the current trends should be preserved, 84.2 per cent of these people (about 360 000 per year) are going to set off on the Eastern Mediterranean migration route.

The information about Iraq is as follows: by 2025, some 7 million people joining the economically active population group and 1.2 million people leaving permanently this group. Out of all the people who have joined this group, some 4.1 million are going to need new jobs. This is going to keep the intensity of the current migratory pressure and could even make it more intense. The emigration flows could reach an annual number of some 400 thousand people who, if keeping the standard practices, could follow in the footsteps of

their predecessors along the Eastern Mediterranean migration route.

Of course, all these prognostications are rather conditional but they reveal the actual potential of the future migratory pressure, part of which is going to be exercised upon Bulgaria, too. To forecast more accurately its future parameters, by using the proposed sociological method can gather data on the propensity to emigrate ε in Bulgaria or any other country subject to migration pressures. This will allow adequate, rational and timely management of resources necessary for the controlling of migratory pressure.

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