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PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN BULGARIA

Martin Konstantinov

*Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences*

13A Moskovska Str., 1000 Sofia, BULGARIA

martin.konstantinov@gmail.com,
mkonstantinov@bas.bg

Abstract. *The influence of basic human values on citizens' ideo-political orientation has been extensively documented in the literature. An important component of political orientation, attitudes towards immigrants in host societies are no exception in their dependence on some of the personal value categories identified by Schwartz in his Theory of basic values (Schwartz 1992).*

The results of two studies that employ Schwartz's value categories and aim to explore the relationship between Bulgarian citizens' values and their attitudes towards immigrants in the country are presented. Study 1 is a nationally representative sociological survey, and Study 2 uses qualitative research methods to examine the link between Bulgarian party members' values on one hand and their political orientation and attitudes towards immigrants on the other. While Study 1 provides evidence of the dependence of Bulgarians' attitudes towards immigrants on Universalism, Security, Tradition and Self-direction value categories, Study 2 results show a strong dependence of party members' attitudes towards immigrants on political affiliation, and an insignificant one on individual values. Both studies contribute to ideology and immigration research literature in Bulgaria by proposing and empirically testing a values-based model of ideological orientation that is relevant to the Bulgarian context. Given the prevalence of the "conservative ideological and values complex" (Konstantinov 2022), in Bulgarian society and in other Eastern European countries, the findings could have implications for the analyses of negative attitudes towards immigration not only in the Balkan country but in the wider post-Soviet space as well.

Keywords: values; attitudes to immigrants; ideology; political values; conservative value complex.

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INTRODUCTION

Two main types of theories have been proposed to account for citizens' attitudes to immigrants: "rational" theories that posit material interests are the main source of such attitudes, and "symbolic" theories that focus on identities and values. These two theoretic strands give rise to differing hypotheses about the determinants of public opinion at both the individual and social level. The current study focuses on values as individual differences in basic value priorities seem to have the greatest importance among the many variables that could influence individual differences in the tendency for social contact with external groups (Davidov, et al., 2008). A given value influences the attitudes towards an object if it has relevant consequences for the attainment of the motivational goals associated with the respective value (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Thus, human values that have their motivational goals supported or violated by the arrival of immigrants, will influence the attitudes towards immigration (Davidov, et al., 2008).

I begin with a brief overview of Schwarz's theory of the universals in the content and structure of human values, and its relevance to the study of political attitudes and ideological orientation. Subject of the second part are some of the "symbolic" theories that focus on values as key determinants of attitudes toward immigrants, along with the manifold manifestations of ethnic exclusion. Both strands could contribute to the developing of a theoretical framework for the study of negative attitudes towards immigrants in Bulgaria. The third part summarizes the results of two recent empirical studies of the relationship between some of the values of the Schwarz theory model and the attitudes towards immigration in Bulgaria.

PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS – FROM BASIC PERSONAL VALUES TO POLITICAL VALUES AND IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

BASIC PERSONAL VALUES – NATURE, CONTENT AND STRUCTURE

For more than a century now, a number of theorists in the fields of psychology, philosophy, sociology and anthropology have devoted a great deal of scientific work to exploring the role of values in the lives of individuals and societies. Both Durkheim (2005) and Weber (2001) emphasize the importance of values for social and personal organization, while

M. Rokeach, in the very introduction of his founding study of values states that it would be difficult for him to point out a problem of potential interest for social scientists in which values are not deeply involved (Rokeach, 1973).

G. Allport, another founder of the theoretical study of values, contends that they are the dominant force in life, as they direct the whole life activity of the individual towards their realization (Allport, 1961). Values are not only subjective expressions of individual or group aspirations and desires, but also function as objective norms and regulators of social behavior. In this role, they form the nucleus of each culture (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).

Values are a significant category for the research fields of various scientific disciplines, as they provide the necessary axiological basis in each cognitive process and contain a criteria system for assessment of objects, people and events. As aggregated standards, values are considered as the criteria individuals use to select and justify actions, and to evaluate people (including themselves) and events (Schwartz, 1992).

Although there is a broad consensus on the key role of values in the social sphere, no such agreement has been achieved among researchers as to the meaning of the term, not only in the social sciences as a whole, but in any particular discipline as well (Van Deth & Scarbrough, 1995). Given the large number of heterogeneous definitions of the notion of values, Schwartz (1992) attempts to point out those key characteristics that major researchers' definitions have in common (Kluckhohn, 1951, Allport, 1961, Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Inglehart, 1997):

- a. Values are convictions inextricably linked to affection and emotion;
- b. They are intended purposes that motivate action;
- c. Unlike norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, and situations, values are abstract and transcend specific situations;
- d. Values act as standards or criteria. They guide the choice or evaluation of actions, policies, people and events.
- e. They are ranked in relation to each other and build a hierarchical system of value priorities, which also distinguishes them from norms and attitudes;
- f. The relative importance of different values guides action. Every attitude or behavior usually affects more than one value. Com-

promise between rival values guides actions or behaviors.

The above features refer to all values. What distinguishes one value from another is the type of purpose or motivation that the given value expresses.

SCHWARZ'S VALUE CATEGORIES AND ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION

Schwarz's theory of the universal content and structure of human values was proposed in 1987 (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) and quickly became the leading theoretical concept in the field of cross-cultural research and psychological research of values (Rohan, 2000). Both the theory itself and the methodology for the empirical study of values undergo several modifications (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Schwartz 2003 Schwartz, et al., 2012). The theory has been verified and confirmed in a large-scale cross-cultural value survey, conducted between 1988 and 2002, that covered over 64,000 people from 67 countries on all continents (Schwartz, 2005). The study provides evidence in favor of the author's claim that the human value system has universal content and structure in all individuals and cultures around the world, and people differ only in the relative importance they attach to each of the universal human values (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).

According to Schwartz, values are desirable, trans-situational goals that vary in importance and act as guiding principles in the lives of people or groups. This definition is close to the definitions of Kluckhohn (1951) and Rokeach (1973). Schwartz considers values as cognitive representations of three types of universal human needs: biological needs, needs for coordination of social interaction, and requirements of public institutions for the preservation and welfare of the social group. The typology that Schwarz and Bilsky offer is based on these three types of universal human needs and hence – on the differences in the motivational content of the values. Thus, there are two fundamental types of relations between the different categories of motivation – mutual exclusion (conflict) and complementarity (compatibility) (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz, 1992). The essence of Schwarz's theory is that the values form a circular motivational continuum. Individual value items occupy their positions on the circular continuum based on the two fundamental types of relationships – compatibility or conflict – between the motivations they express (Schwartz, 2017).

The results from empirical studies, conducted by Schwartz, show that the content and structure of the value system at the individual level include 10 key value categories, with each of them combining values with the same motivational purpose (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). The following have an empirically confirmed impact on attitudes towards immigration:

- a. Security (Conservation dimension) – the motivational objectives of such values are safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships and personality;
- b. Conformity (Conservation) – values that limit actions, tendencies, and impulses that can upset or injure others and violate social expectations or norms (self-discipline, politeness, respect – respecting parents and the elderly);
- c. Tradition (Conservation) – the motivational goals of the values of the category Tradition are respect, dedication and acceptance of the customs and ideas that a culture or a religion impose on the individual (respect for tradition, modesty, moderation, acceptance of one's fate, etc.);
- d. Benevolence (Self-transcendence dimension) – values aimed at the well-being of people with whom we have frequent personal contacts (generosity, devotion, responsiveness, responsibility, loyalty, true friendship, true love);
- e. Universalism (Self-transcendence) – values of understanding, tolerance and preservation of the well-being of all people and nature (social justice, equality, unity with nature, wisdom, environmental protection, a world at peace, etc.).

Sagiv & Schwartz (1995), among others, find persuasive empirical evidence that the three value categories of the Conservation dimension are negatively correlated with the readiness of out-group contact, an important predictor of attitudes to immigrants, and provide the following explanations:

1. For conformity values there is a negative correlation with readiness for outgroup contact, because such contact places one in situations where familiar norms do not apply, making it difficult to maintain smooth relations and to avoid violating expectations. Indeed, the very act of contact with out-group members might be perceived as violating in-group social norms;

2. For security values: Accepting out-group members into society threatens disruption of the prevailing social order because they are different and may press for change;
3. For tradition values, the reason being that such contact entails exposure to divergent traditions and customs, threatening those for whom maintenance of own traditions is important (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995).

As to the determinants of positive attitudes to immigrants, the value categories of the Self-transcendence dimension stand out as contact with out-group members is clearly relevant to universalism values. Universalism values emphasize understanding and accepting of all human beings, even those whose lifestyles differ considerably from one's own. These values' goals of tolerance and concern led the authors to hypothesize, before confirming empirically, a positive correlation for universalism values, and a weaker but still significant one for benevolence values. This is due to out-group social contact being less relevant to benevolence values because these values are mainly expressed in everyday relations with close others, while the common perception of out-groups is one of strangers.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF CITIZENS' IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

The traditional view in political science is that an individual's political orientation is constructed in the process of political socialization, in which individuals internalize a political perspective that shapes their ideas about how power is distributed, how it is organized, and how the world around them should be organized (Glasberg & Shannon, 2011). These perceptions in turn shape individuals' definitions of what their place is and what their behavior should be in relation to the political and economic institutions of the society in which they live. Proponents of such views believe that political attitudes are the result of rational, conscious responses to objective reality. On the other hand, numerous empirical studies reveal that political orientation is to a greater extent predetermined by hereditary and psychological characteristics of individuals than the result of political socialization or sociodemographic factors (Niemi & Jennings, 1991; Plutzer, 2002).

One of the characteristics of politics in the 21st century is the increasing personalization in which the individuality of voters – their moral preferences and values – plays an increasingly significant role in political choice and political discourse and influenc-

es their policy decisions to a greater extent than sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, educational level and income (Caprara, Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara, Vecchione, Schwartz, 2009). A number of factors contribute to the strengthening of this process: the higher educational level of citizens, their increased awareness of their political rights, easier access to information, etc. All these changes require the understanding of the voter as a rational agent, giving his preferences to those platforms or politicians that correspond to the greatest extent to his beliefs and values (Caprara, Vecchione, Schwartz, 2009). New developments also confirm the role of personality studies as an indispensable tool in the analysis of ideological rifts in the contemporary world (Caprara, 2007).

Political attitudes and orientations have long been the subject of research by psychologists (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Eysenck, 1954; Rokeach, 1973), but in the last twenty years there has been a growing interest in studying political behavior from socio-cognitive and motivational perspectives. (Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008). Key to such theoretical approaches is the assumption that espousing certain political beliefs satisfies a variety of motivational needs, suggesting that individuals' personality traits may predetermine their choice of particular ideologies over others (Hirsh, et al., 2009). Using as a starting point the assumption that "...certain ideologies appeal to different individuals to different degrees depending on the individual's needs and the extent to which they are satisfied or offended by the given ideology" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2), psychologists assume that there is a wide range of dispositional (personal) and situational variables that are able to influence psychological needs and hence political orientation.

Thus, more and more researchers believe that the answer to the question "Why are some people predisposed to a liberal and others to a conservative ideological orientation?" should be sought by studying the psychological processes that build the motivational substructure of ideologies.

Researchers in the field of moral psychology also believe that there are distinct motivational systems that underlie different moral values and political leanings. Thus, liberalism arises from psychological systems different from those that give rise to conservatism (Hirsh, et al., 2009). In particular, political conservatism is thought to represent a belief system based on resistance to change and acceptance of inequality – strategies that serve to protect against feelings of threat and uncertainty (Jost et al., 2007).

Support for this explanatory model is found both in correlational studies in which conservative beliefs are associated with uncertainty avoidance and acceptance of inequality, and in experiments in which increasing the intensity of a given threat increases support for conservative values (Jost, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004).

According to the theory of moral foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009), human morality can be summarized in five basic moral domains. This theoretical model demonstrates that the relative importance of these areas is different for liberals and conservatives. Thus, for liberals, compassion and justice are more important, while conservatives place greater importance on in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity (Hirsch, 2009). The authors believe that differences in the intensity of these basic motivational systems influence political attitudes and ideologies. Such patterns suggest that people may lean toward conservative and liberal moral values at the same time, for example, individuals with a strong preference for order are not necessarily anti-egalitarian, or those who are open to new experiences are not necessarily egalitarian. Instead, attitudes toward equality and order may vary independently of each other in accordance with the influence of their differing underlying motivational systems (Hirsch, 2009). If this is true, then using a single dimension to assess political attitudes (conservatism vs. liberalism) could prove insufficient and even misleading, especially in the Bulgarian case, where these ideologies do not exist in their “pure”, Western version.

SCHWARTZ’S RESEARCH ON VALUES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Despite the long-standing scientific interest in the topic, the systematic study of the relationship between values and political preferences became possible after the publication of the works of Rokeach and Schwartz, who offered a clear and coherent conceptualization of values (Rokeach, 1973, 1979; Schwartz, 1992).

A number of researchers have argued that individual values underlie political orientations (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Feldman, 1988, 2003; Schwartz, 1994). Through individual values people organize and prioritize their beliefs and feelings about political issues, communicate about politics, and make and justify their political decisions (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione & Barbaranelli, 2006; Feldman, 2003;

Schwartz). Values are also considered the building blocks (principles) on which political ideologies are built (Converse, 1964; Feldman 1988; Rokeach 1973; Schwartz et al., 2010).

However, a growing body of literature asserts that unidimensional models prove insufficient to capture the diversity of ideological orientations, and that more nuanced, two-dimensional models are needed, including an economic dimension (left-right), which takes into account the degree of economic equality between people, and a social dimension (liberalism-conservatism), taking into account levels of social change alongside individual rights and freedoms (Janda, 1980; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). According to Schwartz’s observation, these two dimensions find their parallel in the two bipolar dimensions of his theory of the universal content and structure of the value system (Schwartz, 1994):

- The dimension social liberalism - conservatism corresponds to the dimension Openness to change - Conservation from the theory of basic individual values of Schwartz;
- The economic dimension, which refers to the distribution of resources and the degree of government intervention in the economy, corresponds to the value bipolar dimension Self-transcendence – Self-enhancement.

Linking core values to positions on both political dimensions, Schwartz and colleagues posit that voters prefer political platforms and formations that are likely to support their pursuit of their cherished values and protect those values from threat (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2010). At the same time, citizens reject policies and parties that are likely to threaten the values they hold dear. Following this logic, people who prioritize values from the Openness to Change dimension should support policies that protect individual freedoms and civil rights. On the other hand, citizens who place more importance on self-assertion values should choose non-egalitarian policies that allow them to pursue their interests unencumbered by state intervention and preserve the resources they accumulate (Pioro, Schwartz, Davidov, 2011).

Several studies prove the existence of dependence between the value categories of Schwartz’s taxonomy and the political choices of citizens (Barnea, Schwartz, 1998; Caprara et al., 2006). In the Italian parliamentary elections in 2001, voters who give priority to Universalism values more often vote for left-wing parties emphasizing solidarity and pluralism,

and right-wing parties show higher scores for Security and lower for Universalism compared to the Left (Caprara et al., 2006). These differences correspond to Western democracies' traditional right-wing and conservative ideologies' concern with social order and to that of left-wing and liberal ideologies' concern with equality, solidarity and social justice. It is important to note that a study of Italian elections found a significant relationship between core values and political party choice, while sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, and education had a negligible effect on political choice (Caprara et al., 2006).

Political preferences correlate with a surprisingly large number of psychological characteristics. For example, as early as the middle of the last century, liberals and conservatives in the USA were found to differ in traits such as confidence, social behavior, mood, cognitive complexity, and preferred leadership styles (McCloskey, 1958). Schwartz's research found that conservatives value security and conformity, and liberals value self-expression and stimulation, and these values are reliable predictors of election behavior (Schwartz et al., 2010). Also, liberals and conservatives take different considerations into account when making moral judgments.

At the same time, findings from a comparative empirical study of Western and Eastern European countries indicate that psychological preferences for traditionalism and rule-following lead to right-wing political orientation in both Eastern and Western Europe, while acceptance of inequality is associated with right-wing orientation only in the West. Although openness to new experiences is associated with preferences for equality in both regions, it is associated with left orientation in Western and right orientation in Eastern Europe; conversely – the need for security is associated with right-wing orientation in Western and left-wing orientation in Eastern Europe. Obviously, the security associated with a certain political regime (regardless of its ideology), which over a long period of time has shaped people's lives and personalities, appeals to certain personality traits. For the countries of Eastern Europe and Bulgaria in particular, the conclusion of this study is particularly important, namely that psychological characteristics are undoubtedly related to ideological and political beliefs, but the specific features and structure of each country inevitably lead to differences in these relations between individual countries and in the different epochs (Thorisdottir et al., 2007).

VALUES AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE – RECENT RESEARCH

A number of recent studies have researched the link between basic human values and immigration attitudes in Eastern and Western Europe (see, for example Araujo, et al., 2019; Davidov, et al., 2021; Lancaster, 2021; Messing and Ságvári, 2021). A comparative analysis of attitudes toward immigrants and values based on European Social Survey (2002 to 2018 waves) data supports findings of previous research concerning the importance of humanitarian and security-related values in developing attitudes towards immigrants. According to the authors those who attribute great significance to security tend to be more negative towards immigrants, while those who value equality and respect for other people are the least fearful of migrants. Other basic values measured by the remaining items (such as achievement, hedonism, power, self-direction, and stimulation) seem to have only a weak or non-existent relationship with how people think about migration (Messing and Ságvári, 2021).

An international comparative study focused on Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and Social-dominance orientation (SDO) values shows that females, young people, and people with high levels of religiosity and high self-reported social status have a more positive view of immigrants. Considering values and ideological beliefs, results showed that RWA, SDO, and existence values predict attitudes toward immigrants negatively, while suprapersonal and interactive values are positively associated with attitudes toward immigrants (Araujo, et al., 2019).

As to the geography of immigration attitudes, a 2021 study comparing European Value Study (EVS) data from 2008 and 2017 across 10 East European EU member states finds evidence that even though West European countries bore the brunt of the Syrian refugees influx, the crisis nonetheless increased the salience of the immigration issue for East Europeans due to political elites connecting this issue to existing nationalist and traditionalist attitudes (Lancaster, 2021). The author contends that, using the region's latent potential for mobilization around the issue, it was not difficult for Eastern European elites to repackage the sociocultural dimension to comprise immigration attitudes, evoking a 'European nationalism' which deploys a particular conceptualization of European identity, emphasizing Christianity and traditional values against Muslim outsiders as well as European cosmopolitans.

Finally, a comparative analysis of changes in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes in Europe using EVS data reveals that negative attitudes towards Muslims and immigrants have decreased in Western Europe during the 1990-2017 period, whereas they have increased significantly in Eastern Europe (Bell, et al., 2021). Such findings attest to the importance of value priorities as determinants of immigration attitudes and support the conclusions of a transformation of the Iron Curtain that divided the continent politically before the 1990s into a value rift, with politically united Europe today once again divided geographically by huge differences in public attitudes on social issues such as immigration, minorities, abortion same-sex marriage, nationality, etc. (Pew Research Center, 2018). Thus, comparative empirical evidence points to a values conflict between nationalist, traditionalist, relatively intolerant towards minority and immigrant groups Eastern and liberal-progressive, tolerant Western Europe.

A VALUES-BASED MODEL OF IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION IN BULGARIA

It has already been noted in previous paragraphs that unidimensional models prove insufficient to capture the diversity of ideological orientations, and that more complex models are needed. This is especially valid in Eastern European states, and Bulgaria in particular, where the differing socio-political trajectories and attitudes prove the traditional Western bipolar Left – Right ideological orientation models of limited empirical value.

In order to account for such differences, a novel values-based model of Eastern Europeans' ideological orientation has been proposed, that was empirically tested in Bulgaria in two studies (Konstantinov, 2022). In the proposed conceptualization, each of the four generalized ideological categories (Left, Right, Liberalism, Conservatism) includes a set of political values characterized by opposite motivational content and socio-political goals vis-à-vis its antagonist within the two bipolar dimensions Left / Right (in the economic sphere) and Liberalism / Conservatism (in the social sphere). Using the strict distinction drawn between the political values relating to each of the two spheres, this conceptualization not only avoids stereotypical, hence inaccurate, ideological definitions, but also allows for a precise visualization of the individual's ideological views within the coordinate system consisting of the aforementioned bipolar dimensions.

The model's assumption is that political orientation is influenced by basic individual values, defined as a motivational substructure of ideologies, through the mediation of political values. Ideological and political attitudes are formed in the course of a process referred to as „elective affinities“ (Jost et al., 2009): the individual chooses those leaders and political platforms that they have reason to believe will uphold their own values and motivational goals. Thus, people who value security and tradition are more inclined to support conservative political leaders, and political models that emphasize the preservation of the nation, law, order and safety from external and internal threats. At the same time, citizens who are driven by universalist values are tolerant of uncertainty, open to change, and prefer liberal political leaders and models emphasizing tolerance, equality and individual freedom.

CORE POLITICAL VALUES

The present study focuses on core political values as a key theoretical construction in the analysis of the sources of political attitudes, and the formation of preferences for certain policies within the hierarchically structured belief system of individuals. Fundamental political values (hereinafter abbreviated as “political values”) represent comprehensive normative principles and beliefs regarding the governance of the state, the rights and obligations of citizens. They facilitate taking positions on specific political issues and serve as generalized starting points in the otherwise complex and confusing sphere of politics and ideology (McCann, 2008). Similar is the view of Converse, for whom political values are „...a kind of glue that binds together a large number of specific attitudes and beliefs“ (Converse, 1964, 211) and to some extent gives them structure, coherence and consistency (Feldman, 2003).

Schwartz and colleagues are among the most consistent researchers of the relationship between individual and political values over the past 20 years. According to them, the former are more abstract and fundamental than political values, which can be considered as their expression in the field of politics. Individual values organize and structure the political ones – people are oriented towards ideologies or policies that will contribute to the achievement of their personal, intimate values (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010).

Unlike individual values, political values have no application outside the realm of politics. They are usually measured by an individual's agreement or




Figure 1. Personality predictors of ideology and voting (Caprara, Vecchione 2018)

SPHERE	SOCIAL				ECONOMIC			
IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORY	CONSERVATISM			LIBERALISM		LEFT	RIGHT	
POLITICAL VALUE	Security, law and order	Statism	Ethnic nationalism	Traditionalism	Civil rights and freedoms	Social progressivism	Equality	Free enterprise
BASIC INDIVIDUAL VALUES								

Figure 2. A values-based model of ideological orientation in Bulgaria (Konstantinov 2022)

disagreement with certain policies. Although people have preferences among their political values, these preferences do not necessarily form a hierarchy (Vecchione et al., 2012). The authors conclude that there is a causal hierarchy from basic personality traits and values through political values to ideology, objectified in voting for a particular political force (Figure 1).

At this stage the literature lacks a unified theoretical framework for political values, or consensus on their number and content (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). Different authors point to a different number of political values with somewhat overlapping scope and content.

Schwartz and colleagues summarize the different typologies and identify six policy values that they subject to empirical testing (Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). For the purposes of this empirical study I use their classification with some modifications in the number and scope of values imposed by Bulgarian specificities:

- Security, law and order;
- Statism;
- Nationalism;
- Traditionalism;
- Civil rights and freedoms;
- Social progressivism;
- Equality;
- Free enterprise/ Minimal state.

The proposed conceptualization is based on a three-stage model of the ideological orientation of the individual as a function of the basic individual

values through the mediation of political values. In this model, conservatism and liberalism are taken as generalized ideological categories, representing the ideological orientation of the individual in the social sphere; and left and right, in the economic sphere. Each of the generalized ideological categories is made up of political values, which in turn represent a political expression of the basic individual values (Figure 2).

There are three differences between the proposed set of political values and that of the study by Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione (2010) – the political values Blind Patriotism and Law and order are modified into Ethnic nationalism, and Security, law and order, respectively, with a new category of Statism being added.

METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

This publication presents the results of two empirical studies conducted in Bulgaria in 2018.

Study 1 is a nationally representative empirical sociological study of the social aspects of modern migration processes, conducted by a team at the Institute of Philosophy and sociology. The survey is representative of the Bulgarian adult population and was conducted with a two-stage nest sample of 800 people with data used here being weighted by sex and age;

Study 2 („Values and ideo-political orientation – relations and dependencies“) is an individual research project, aiming to establish through in-depth interviews with members of left, right, nationalist

and liberal political parties in Bulgaria the dependence of their political orientation on their value priorities. The study employs an empirical toolbox integrating the PVQ 21 questionnaire (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001) with questions about some of Hofstede's value categories and an original questionnaire on political values and ideological orientation.

The following research hypotheses on the relationship between values and attitudes towards immigrants were subjected to empirical testing during the two studies:

1. The values of self-transcendence (universalism and, to a lesser extent, benevolence) are related to higher levels of acceptance of immigrants and concern for their rights. People for whom these values are a priority also express fewer fears about the immigrants' presence and are less inclined to express ethnic prejudices, resistance to immigrants and ethnic distance;
2. The value categories of the conservation dimension (conformity, tradition and security) are positively correlated with resistance to immigrants, fears of their presence and ethnic distance;
3. Unlike Western countries, in Bulgaria people of right-wing economic orientation endorse liberal attitudes in the social sphere and are expected to show greater acceptance and concern for immigrants;

4. Members of nationalist and left-wing parties are expected to have negative perceptions of immigrants and perceive their presence as a threat.

RESULTS

Study 1. In order to establish whether there is a link between values and attitudes towards immigrants, the answers to questions on the value categories security, tradition, self-direction and universalism were compared with respondents' opinions on various issues concerning immigration. The representative survey largely confirms the starting hypotheses for some of Schwarz's values. Bulgarian citizens, who attach great importance to security, are much more likely to show resistance to immigrants and ethnic distance. The more important security is as a value priority for them, the more respondents are inclined to support restrictive immigration policies of closed borders to prevent all immigrants for entering the country (Table 1), and less likely to accept an immigrant as a family member (Table 2).

The results also show that tradition – another value category with a main motivational objective to maintain the existing situation – is also associated with a clear resistance to immigrants. The more significant tradition is as a value, the lower the support for a policy of open borders and acceptance of all immigrants (Table 3).

Table 1. Comparison Security – Resistance to immigrants

How important are security and peaceful life for you? (Security value)	NO immigrants should be admitted to the country	
	YES	NO
1 Very important	41,05%	58,95%
2	41,27%	58,73%
3	34,55%	65,45%
4	19,34%	80,66%
5 Not important at all	–	–

Table 2. Comparison Security – Ethnic distance

How important are security and peaceful life for you? (Security value)	Would you accept an immigrant as a family member?	
	YES	NO
1 Very important	9,72%	90,28%
2	10,26%	89,74%
3	13,75%	86,25%
4	15,32%	84,68%
5 Not important at all	–	–

Table 3. Comparison Tradition – acceptance of immigrants

How important are in your life: Bulgarian traditions and culture? (Tradition)	Our country should accept all immigrants	
	YES	NO
1 Very important	10,02%	89,98%
2	12,99%	87,01%
3	12,25%	87,75%
4	23,85%	76,15%
5 Not important at all	24,85%	75,15%

Table 4. Comparison Universalism – Ethnic distance

How important are in your life: Caring for others and the common good? (Universalism)	Would you agree to immigrants settling in your neighborhood?	
	YES	NO
1 Very important	29,71%	70,29%
2	20,24%	79,76%
3	17,68%	82,32%
4	9,24%	90,76%
5 Not important at all	6,28%	93,72%

Table 5. Comparison Self-direction – Ethnic distance

How much do you aim for: Creativity, originality, new ideas? (Self-direction)	Would you agree to immigrants settling in your neighborhood?	
	YES	NO
1 Very much	29,74%	70,26%
2	28,12%	71,88%
3	20,50%	79,50%
4	15,45%	84,55%
5 Not at all	12,31%	87,69%

The values of universalism, on the other hand, show a significant correlation with the smaller ethnic distance (Table 4).

Empirical data also testifies to a relationship that was not present in the hypotheses and which is scarcely mentioned in the research literature on values and immigration. The value category self-direction is associated with a smaller ethnic distance (Table 5).

These results point to a conclusion that in Bulgaria people, for whom creativity and freedom of thought are a value priority, express fewer fears about the presence of immigrants. It is no coincidence that this value category is part of the openness to change dimension that stands in opposition to the motivational content of the conservation dimension, the latter being associated with a negative attitude towards immigration. The results of the study correspond

with data obtained from a number of international surveys and fit into a common model of relations between values and attitudes towards immigrants where the conservative values of preservation (security, conformity and tradition) correlate negatively with acceptance of immigration, and the values of self-transcendence (universalism and benevolence) show a positive correlation across countries and contexts (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012; Davidov et al., 2008; Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2010).

Study 2. Several major topics were included in the survey questionnaire to find out how respondents assess immigration's impact on different spheres of public life. The hypothesized link between the individual values of party members and their attitudes towards immigrants receives little empirical support. The results give reason to assume that the political orientation and party affiliation of

the respondents are a much more important factor determining their attitudes towards immigration compared to their values. The analysis of the data shows that members of the right and liberal parties express positive attitude towards immigrants, with weaker perceptions of threat. Nationalists and left party members express the most negative attitudes towards immigrants (Figure 3).

With the exception of right-wingers, all other party members consider immigrants to be above all a threat to security, then to culture, and the smallest percentage of respondents believe they are a threat to natives' jobs (Figure 3). Respondents highlighted three main arguments when they downplayed the threat to jobs: 1. „Today's immigrants are unskilled and cannot compete with Bulgarians on the labor market.“; 2. „The immigrants' goal is to settle in Western Europe and they do not intend to stay here.“ and 3. „Bulgarian economy suffers from a lack of la-

bor force and there is work for everyone who wants to work“. Despite these arguments, the conservative axis, formed by left-wingers and nationalists for the most part believes that immigration poses risks for the jobs of Bulgarians.

So far the only respondents who gave positive answers to the question of whether immigrants enrich our culture have been right-wing party members. As a whole, right-wingers' views on this issue have been balanced and their attitudes remain neutral. The strongest disagreement with this claim was made by representatives of the nationalist parties. The impact of a demographic factor, namely the age of the respondents, should also be noted – older adults showed a greater ethnic distance than young people, irrespective of their party affiliation. The exception here are the nationalists, where anti-immigrant attitudes are ubiquitous. Although few of the liberals accept immigration as a phenomenon that




Figure 3. Party affiliation and attitudes towards immigrants. Due to the formulation of the questions positive results signify negative attitudes towards immigrants and vice versa




Figure 4. Party affiliation and attitudes towards immigrants – summary results

somehow enriches the traditional Bulgarian culture, an equally small percentage of them consider them a threat in this domain. Thus, with regard to the threat to our culture, the four types of parties are divided into the two familiar blocs – liberal and conservative, and, as with other issues, the intensity of concern among conservatives is very high and the vast majority of opinions about immigration are negative. At the same time, a much wider palette of opinions is found among liberals and the right, which brings the results closer to neutral values.

The results point to clear dividing lines in attitudes toward immigrants based on party affiliation. However, the positions are not too far apart – among the members of each party (except nationalists) there are both consistent opponents of immigration and people for whom it is not such a serious problem. However, it is extremely important to note that even among the right-wing and liberals, the lack of a sense of threat does not a priori lead to a positive attitude and active support for the process of immigration to the country. In this case, the proactive position in defense of the rights of newcomers, characteristic of social progressives in the West, is also missing. Instead, among activists from the liberal bloc, opinions are observed where moderate concerns are to some extent neutralized by a tolerant and humane attitude.

The statistical processing of the data also confirms the existence of a conservative-traditionalist value complex – a statistically significant linear relationship is established between the political values of traditionalism, statism and nationalism on one hand and negative attitudes towards immigrants on the other (Konstantinov 2021).

CONCLUSION

Interviews with members of Bulgarian political parties demonstrate the importance of ideological-political orientation and party affiliation in shaping attitudes toward immigration. The image of the immigrant as a political symbol activates latent political values and gives rise to opposite emotional attitudes among the representatives of the right-wing and liberal parties on the one hand, who emphasize the need for humane treatment of immigrants and downplay the threat to security, culture and jobs in the country. On the other hand, among leftist and patriotic organizations, this image creates a sense of threat and a desire for ethnic exclusion.

Both studies discussed in this publication represent the first attempts in Bulgarian social science to look for empirical confirmation of the links between

basic individual values and political orientation in the country. The studies confirmed the initial hypotheses of a dependency of negative attitudes to immigrants on the Security and Tradition value categories, and of positive attitudes on Universalism values, providing evidence of the relevance of Schwartz's theoretic model for the analysis of political attitudes in Eastern European states. At the same time they provided ample evidence for the existence of a conservative-traditionalist value complex bundling together the political values of traditionalism, statism and nationalism on one hand and negative attitudes towards immigrants on the other. And although the terms Liberal, Conservative, Left and Right may have differing meanings and content in Eastern Europe, the results provide evidence that the pathway through which basic individual values influence political values, and through them affect the formation of political attitudes and ideological orientation, exists in Eastern Europe as well. The proposed values-based model of ideological orientation in Bulgaria received empirical support, and the results obtained confirm the position of values as a useful theoretical construct both in the scientific analysis and in the development of values-based policies for the management of crises caused by intensified migration processes. The established multidisciplinary theoretical framework for a complex analysis of immigration attitudes could serve as a platform for future in-depth studies in this research area.

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Martin Konstantinov, PhD is an assistant professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Among his research interests is the study of the complex interplay between, basic individual values, political values and ideology. He has participated in several empirical research projects dedicated to the psychological determinants of ideological beliefs and political attitudes to immigration in Bulgaria. Martin has published the results of his research in Bulgarian and international academic journals and conference proceedings.